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BECOMING VISIBLE: THE ADA'S IMPACT ON HEALTH
CARE FOR PERSONS wrrH DISABILITIES
Mary Crossley*

I. INTRODUCTION

When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") in 1990, it included the underlying legislative "findings and
purposes" in the statute itself and stated as one of its findings that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as... health services."' Congress went on to announce that it was

the ADA's purpose "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 2 Based on these statements, one would surmise that in 1990
Congress believed that all was not well when it- came to the ability of
Americans with disabilities to access and receive needed health services.
Indeed, the voluminous legislative history that underpins the ADA includes ample testimony regarding the barriers that people with disabilities faced in obtaining health care.
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and Visiting
Professor, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks go to Cecily Freyermuth, Jason
Mayo, and Jamie Nye for their valuable research assistance and to the Hastings College of the
Law Summer Stipend Program for supporting my research.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994).
1.
Id. § 12101(bXl).
2.
See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E1839 (daily ed. June 7, 1990) (citing the need for auxiliary
3.
aids in places of public accommodation in speech by the Honorable Steny H. Hoyer); Americans
with DisabilitiesAct of 1988: Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Select Education of
the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 984 (1991) (citing that health care workers
and hospitals are unwilling to care or are providing substandard care for HIV-infected persons in
testimony and prepared statement of Adm. James Watkins, Chairperson of the President's
Comm'n on the HIV Epidemic); 136 CONG. REC. E1839 (daily ed. June 7, 1990) (citing the need
for all newly constructed health care facilities above one-story tall to include elevators in speech
by the Honorable Steny H. Hoyer); Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on HR.
2273 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,101st Cong. 269 (1989) (finding in survey published by The
Research and Training Center on Independent Living at the University of Kansas that disabled
persons were unable to obtain health insurance or found that health insurance did not cover sup-
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As part of this Symposium's ten-year retrospective on the ADA, this
Article will examine how effective the ADA has proven in addressing
these barriers. What impact has the passage of the ADA had on health

care for people with disabilities? The simplicity with which the question
can be framed, however, belies the variety and complexity of the subject
matter that potentially falls within its scope. Certainly, when we talk
about the ADA's impact on health care for people with disabilities, we
are talking about the physical accessibility of facilities providing health
services, 4 the availability of auxiliary aids for people with vision and
hearing impairments, and the influeijce of patients' disabilities on providers' medical decisions. But we are also talking about whether the
ADA has affected decisions by third-party payers-be they traditional
health insurers, health maintenance organizations, or state Medicaid
agencies-regarding health care financing and coverage available to
people with disabilities. We could also talk about how the ADA affects
the ability of states and localities to engage in public health regulation
that limits the freedom of persons infected with communicable diseases 5
and whether the ADA limits the ability of states to enact legislation legalizing assisted suicide. 6 And, depending on how broadly we define the
services included in "health care services," we could also talk about
plies, equipment, regular medications and therapies used by the disabled).
4.
Public and private healthcare offices and facilities are subject to the same physical accessibility requirements as other public entities under Title II, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12146-47 (1994), and
public accommodations under Title III, see id. § 12183. Issues regarding the physical accessibility
of health care providers have arisen in litigation under the ADA, see, e.g., Anderson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Because those issues are not particular
to the health care setting, however, this Article will not focus on them. For a discussion of accessibility issues, both physical and attitudinal, found in the offices of primary care physicians, see
Ellen W. Grabois et al., Accessibility of Primary Care Physicians' Offices for People with Disabilities:An Analysis of Compliance with the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, ARCHIVES OF FAM.
MED., Jan./Feb. 1999.
5.
See City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (finding
that New Jersey's tuberculosis control statute did not violate the ADA); Josephine Gittler, Controlling Resurgent Tuberculosis: Public Health Agencies, Public Policy, and Law, 19 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 107 (1994); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and the
Corpus of Anti-DiscriminationLaw: A Forcefor Change in the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 89 (1993).
6.
Cf Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995) (enjoining effectiveness of Oregon's Death With Dignity Act based on violation of Equal Protection Clause; declining to address
ADA claim in light of constitutional holding), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1382, 1390 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to establish actual injury required for standing). For discussions of the implications of legalizing physician-assisted suicide for persons with disabilities, see Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., National Council on Disability, Assisted Suicide: A Disability Perspective, 14
ISSUES L. & MED. 273 (1998); Mark C. Siegel, Lethal Pity: The Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
Its Implicationsfor the Disabled,and the Strugglefor Equality in an Able-Bodied World, 16 L. &
INEQ. J. 259 (1998); Stephen L. Mikochik, Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations
Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Assisted Suicide and Disabled People, 46 DEPAUL L.
REV. 987 (1997). Cf Paul Steven Miller, The Impact ofAssisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities - Is it a Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 47-48 (1993) (arguing that society's
growing acceptance of assisted suicide for persons with disabilities is rooted in prejudice against
persons with disabilities).
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what rights to placement in community-based, rather than institutional,
settings the ADA gives to people with physical and mental disabilities
various forms of assistance in performing activities of daily
who need
7
living.
Each of the foregoing questions poses intriguing issues about the
ADA's application to "the critical area of... health services,"' and each
has generated litigation and commentary in the legal literature. Analyzing the ADA's implications for various aspects of health care raises fascinating issues for several reasons. First, because many persons with
disabilities have ongoing and sometimes extensive health care needs as a
result of their disabilities, legal protection against discrimination in accessing health care services can be of critical importance. Health care is
sometimes referred to as "special," or different from other social goods,
because of its necessity in enabling individuals to maintain the health
and functioning that allow them to benefit from or enjoy other social
goods such as education, employment, recreation, and social activities. 9
In addition, health care decisions-whether one considers a provider's
medical treatment decisions for a patient or decisions regarding insurance coverage or the features of a state Medicaid plan-are typically
complex, multifactorial decisions. As a result, trying to tease out what
role disability plays in the decision-making process and whether that
role should be deemed legitimate or illegitimate can be quite problematic.
Indeed, it was in part the complexity of health care decision-making
and the consequent difficulty of applying disability discrimination principles to those decisions that led courts interpreting the ADA's predecessor statute, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,10 to take a
hands-off approach to health care issues. In two of the most significant
health care cases decided under Section 504, each court effectively
7.
Cf. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (holding that unjustified institutional segregation constitutes discrimination violating the ADA). Although Olmstead involved plaintiffs
who were institutionalized for their mental disabilities, the issue can also arise regarding the
institutional placement of individuals with physical disabilities.
8.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994).
See 1983 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
9.
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES (1983)

(recognizing the unique importance of health care in people's lives); Norman Daniels, HealthCareNeeds and DistributiveJustice, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146, 166 (1981) (describing health
care as a "strategically important contributor[] to fair equality of opportunity").
10.
Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
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found that the statute had limited, if any, application to health care decisions. In Alexander v. Choate," the Supreme Court decided that the
State of Tennessee was free to limit the days of hospital care that its
Medicaid program would pay for, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' claims
that the limit discriminated against persons with disabilities because of
their greater need for extended hospital care.12 The Court assumed that a
disparate impact theory of discrimination could apply in at least some
cases arising under Section 504,13 but concluded that the statute did not
require Tennessee to analyze the impact of its Medicaid policy decisions
on people with disabilities and then avoid decisions that would negatively impact those citizens.' 4 The Court rejected such a requirement as
"virtually unworkable" and refused to second guess the State's judgment.' 5 In the same vein, in United States v. University Hospital,'6 the
Second Circuit concluded that Section 504 did not apply to medical
treatment decisions for disabled infants.' 7 The case was one of the
"Baby Doe" cases in which the federal government sued a hospital under Section 504 for failing to perform corrective surgery on an infant
born with spina bifida and microcephaly.' In finding Section 504 inapplicable, the court first rejected the government's claim that the infant
was "otherwise qualified" to receive medical treatment, as required by
Section 504, stating that "the phrase cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions without distorting its
plain meaning."' 9 The court then went on to refute the government's
contention that the infant had been subjected to discrimination under
Section 504 as "tak[ing] an oversimplified view of the medical decisionmaking process.' 20
11.
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
12. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 308-09.
13. Id. at 299.
14. See id. at 302-09.
15. Id. The court reasoned:
[Tie require that the sort of broad-based distributive decision at issue in this case
always be made in the way most favorable, or least disadvantageous, to the handicapped, even when the same benefit is meaningfully and equally offered to them,
would be to impose a virtually unworkable requirement on state Medicaid administrators.
Id. at 308.
16.
729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
17.
University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 161.
18.
Id. at 146-48.
19.
Id. at 156.
20. Id. at 157. The court reasoned as follows:
Where the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will
rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was 'discriminatory'. . . . Beyond the fact that no two cases are likely to be the same, it
would invariably require lengthy litigation primarily involving conflicting expert
testimony to determine whether a decision to treat, or not to treat,... was based on
a 'bona fide medical judgment', however that phrase might be defined.
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In light of this apparent judicial reluctance to apply disability discrimination law to health care decisions, scholars wondered aloud when
the ADA was enacted just how much impact it would have on the health
care system. In 1990, Professor Wendy Parmet noted that the ADA's
likely impact beyond "the conceptually simple (albeit not trivial) cases
of physical inaccessibility or irrational prejudice" remained unclear.2
Indeed, she found the statute "extraordinarily unclear about its impact
on medical decision-making" and predicted that the statute would have
little impact on health insurance for people with disabilities. 22 Time has
shown these observations and predictions to be quite astute, although
somewhat limited in their failure to perceive the broad range of health
care contexts in which the ADA would be invoked over the following
decade.
Rather than attempting to address each of the previously suggested
health care contexts in which the ADA has been invoked, this Article
will limit its focus by adopting the perspective of individuals with disabilities 23 in their encounters with the health care finance and delivery
system in the United States, 24 and will pose the question of what the past
-

21.
Wendy E. Parmet, Discriminationand Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 339 (1990).
22. Id. at 339-40. A few years later, Professor Lawrence Gostin was in agreement:
The ADA does rot completely clarify the distinction between the genuine exercise
of clinical judgment and unlawful discrimination .... The ADA... tears down barriers... only in a limited sense. It steadfastly refuses to allow a person to be turned
away because of the provider's fears and biases toward the disability. But it remains
uncertain to what extent the act can help to ensure access to health care for those
who arguably need it most.
Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and the U.S. Health System, 11 HEALTH
AFF.248, 251-52 (1992).
23.
Of course, the scope of the Article's discussion depends to some extent on how broadly
the courts read the ADA's definition of "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). In a trilogy of
cases decided in 1999, the Supreme Court substantially narrowed the prevailing view of the meaning of "disability" by holding that, in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity, courts should consider the impairment in light of any mitigating measures
employed by the individual. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999); Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S.
516, 521 (1999). As a consequence, many individuals with chronic medical conditions that are at
least partially controlled by medication may no longer be deemed individuals with disabilities
under the meaning of the ADA. Id. The potentially perverse implications of this holding can be
spun out in a variety of hypotheticals. For example, one could imagine that persons with chronic
medical conditions who cannot afford to pay out of pocket for medications could sue a state
Medicaid agency for its refusal to pay for their medications as prohibited discrimination based on
disability. Without medication, chronic medical conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, or
epilepsy may well substantially affect an individual's major life activities. If the plaintiffs were
successful and the state Medicaid agency were ordered to pay for those medications, many of the
individuals (once they are able to obtain medications) might no longer qualify as individuals with
disabilities because their condition is now mitigated. At that point, the state Medicaid agency
could discriminate with impunity (at least under the ADA) against those individuals based on their
chronic medical conditions, as long as it doesn't deprive them of access to the medicines which, in
effect, render them nondisabled.
24. As a result of this focus, this Article will not examine the application of the ADA and
Section 504 to the employment and licensing rights of health care workers. This topic is of great
significance for health care workers infected with HIV, see Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys.
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decade has shown the ADA to mean (or not mean) for those individuals'
ability to seek, receive, and pay for effective health care services. To
that end, this Article will provide an overview of three broad areas on
which the ADA has had varying degrees of impact. Part II of the Article
will examine how the ADA has affected the rights of an individual with
a disability who is seeking medical or dental treatment. Health care providers' direct refusals to treat and failures to supply necessary auxiliary
aids are the most obvious instances of disability discrimination in the
health care context, and it is in this context that the ADA has had probably its greatest effect. Less clear has been the Act's applicability to
claims that an individual with a disability has received different and
substandard medical care. Part III will discuss the ADA's impact on
cost-containment efforts in the health care field, ranging from the application of the ADA to managed care practices adopted by private and
public payers to the statute's implication in health care rationing
schemes. Part IV will turn to attempts to apply the ADA to health insurance, an area in which the courts appear increasingly resistant to allowing the ADA a significant role in regulating health insurance. Ultimately, Part V will conclude that the ADA's impact on health care for
persons with disabilities has been mixed. It has played a major role in
addressing the most overt instances of discriminatory behavior, but its
impact on less obvious instances of potentially discriminatory costcutting practices and on health insurance has been more muted and indirect. Nonetheless, I will conclude that the passage of the ADA and the
mere potential of ADA liability has had the beneficial effect of compelling health care decision-makers to take the presence and needs of persons with disabilities into account; in so doing, the ADA has helped to
render persons with disabilities visible in the world of health care.

Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a neurosurgery resident with HIV infection posed a direct threat to potential patients and was therefore not a qualified individual with a
disability), or who have mental illness, see Kirbens v. Wyoming State Bd. of Med., 992 P.2d
1056, 1057 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that state's revocation of license of physician with mental illness did not violate the ADA), or are recovering substance abusers, see Griel v. Franklin Med.
Ctr., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D. Mass. 1999) (upholding dismissal of recovering drug dependent
nurse as nonpretextual), but is of relatively limited significance for persons with disabilities who
are seeking treatment. For discussion of employment rights in the health care context see Mary
Anne Bobinski, Patients andProviders in the Courts: Fracturesin the Americans with Disabilities Act, 61 ALB. L. REV. 785 (1998); Laura F. Rothstein, Health Care Professionals with Mental
and Physical Impairments: Developments in DisabilityDiscriminationLaw, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
973 (1997).
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II. ACCESS AND TREATMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS SEEKING CARE

A. Denials ofAccess
As anticipated by commentators writing at the time of the ADA's
passage, the statute generally has been a powerful tool for addressing
denials of access to medical treatment for persons with disabilities, denials that often reflect health care providers' prejudices and fears. A
provider's refusal to treat a person based on that person's disability is
probably the most direct and overt form of disability discrimination in

the health care context, and it is a form of discrimination that can predictably lead to both adverse physical consequences for the individual
who may not be able to obtain needed medical treatment and psychic
harm flowing from the overt rejection by the health care provider.
The Supreme Court's first case interpreting the ADA, Bragdon v.

Abbott' s exemplifies the statute's application to this type of situation. In
that case, dentist Randon Bragdon refused to fill a cavity of Sidney Abbott, a woman with HIV infection, in his office.26 Abbott sued under
Title III of the ADA, 27 which prohibits disability discrimination by the
operator of a place of public accommodation, 2 a term that expressly
includes the "professional office of a health care provider." 29 While the
dentist argued that providing the requested services in his office would
pose a "direct threat" 30 of HIV transmission to him, the district court
31
rejected this reasoning and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.
The court's analysis indicates that-absent a "direct threat" or some
other defense-a refusal to provide dental treatment to an individual
based on the individual's disability constitutes an ADA violation. 2
25.
524 U.S. 624 (1998).
26. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29. This case does not involve an absolute refusal to treat, for
the dentist offered to fill the cavity at a hospital. Id..at 629. This alternative, however, would have
subjected the plaintiff to additional charges imposed by the hospital. Id. In addition, there was no
evidence that the defendant had privileges at any hospital. Id. at 651.
27. Id. at 629.
28.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) provides: "No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."
29. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
30. The direct threat defense is based on 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994) which provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of others. The term "direct threat" means a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
31.
Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 587-91, 595 (D. Me. 1995).
32. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 584-85. In addition to the direct threat issue, the other issue
central to the case was whether plaintiff's asymptomatic HIV infection constituted a disability
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The question of when the direct threat defense may be invoked ultimately went to the Supreme Court, which addressed whether deference
should be paid to the individual judgment of a health care provider regarding the existence of a significant risk of transmission. 3 The Court
concluded that the existence of significant risk and direct threat-, while it
should be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses to
provide treatment, must be assessed based on objective medical or scientific information. 34 To put it simply, a health care provider cannot avoid
ADA liability for refusal to treat merely by pointing to his good faith
belief that treatment would pose a direct threat to him, unless that belief
is also supported by objective evidence. The Supreme Court's judgment
thereby reinforces the principle that subjective prejudices and irrational
fears are not a legitimate basis for depriving individuals with disabilities
of access to treatment.
In a number of other cases, plaintiffs with HIV infection have sued
providers from whom they sought treatment, alleging that the provider
violated disability discrimination law by referring or transferring the
plaintiff to another, "special" provider based on the patient's HIVpositive status.3 5 In these cases, the provider typically defends by asserting that he is not qualified to treat a person infected with HIV and that
he did not discriminate against the plaintiff by making a referral to a
provider with specialized training or experience. This defense has solid
legal grounding in the Title III regulations issued by the Department of
Justice, which make clear that the ADA in some instances allows referrals of individuals with disabilities to specialists.3 6 Courts encountering
this defense have tended to scrutinize the facts carefully to determine
whether the asserted need for specialized treatment is legitimate or is
instead a pretext for discrimination. So, for example, while one court
under the ADA. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the First
Circuit and the district court in holding that the HIV infection was an impairment that substantially limited the plaintiff's major life activity of reproduction. Id. at 647.
33. Id. at 648-55.
Id. at 649. The Supreme Court was unable to determine, based on the record presented to
34.
it, whether the Court of Appeals had appropriately assessed the existence of direct threat. Id. at
654-55. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the First Circuit for a reconsideration of the
evidence in light of the Court's articulated standard. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 655. On remand, the
First Circuit again concluded that summary judgment for the plaintiff on the question of direct
threat was warranted. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998).
35.
See United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F.
Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995).
28 C.F.R. § 36.302(b)(2) (1999) provides:
36.
A health care provider may refer an individual with a disability to another provider,
if that individual is seeking, or requires, treatment or services outside of the referring provider's area of specialization, and if the referring provider would make a
similar referral for an individual without a disability who seeks or requires the same
treatment or services. A physician who specializes in treating only a particular condition cannot refuse to treat an individual with a disability for that condition, but is
not required to treat the individual for a different condition.
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ruled against a dentist who claimed he was not competent to provide a
routine teeth cleaning to a patient with HIV,37 another court granted
summary judgment to an obstetrician who referred a pregnant woman
to a specialized prowith HIV infection and other medical conditions
3
gram for women and children with HIV.
Bragdon v. Abbot? 9 and the cases involving pretextual referrals illustrate how the ADA can act as a powerful limit on the ability of health
care providers to refuse to provide treatment to individuals with HIV
infection. This limit holds immense meaning for persons with HIV. Surveys of providers conducted during the 1980's and well into the 1990s
indicated a reluctance to treat persons with HIV,40 a group (it should go
without saying) that have significant medical needs. Thus, the consistent
holdings of cases challenging refusals to treat persons with HIV, and
enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice41 send a clear
message to medical and dental providers that refusals to treat are illegitimate and illegal.
While refusal to treat cases arising under the ADA have most commonly been brought by plaintiffs with HIV infection, the statute's pro37. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1168. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the testimony of expert witnesses, including a former official at the American Dental Association, an
academic authority on dentistry and HIV, and an official from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Id. at 1163-64. See also Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 79 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (finding
the defendant's claim that the patient's diagnosis with a rare and potential fatal skin disease was
the reason for his transfer to another hospital to be a pretext); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166,
169, 173 (D.N.J. 1995) (granting motion for default judgment against dentist who referred patient
with HIV infection to "special clinic for HIV," which in fact was a facility providing seryices to
the medically indigent and mentally ill).
38.
Lesley v. Chic, 81 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220-21, 227 (D. Mass. 2000). In addition, the hospital
at which the defendant physician had admitting privileges did not include AZT in its hospital
formulary. Id. at 220. (AZT is a drug whose administration to a pregnant woman during pregnancy
and labor significantly lowers the rate of mother-to-infant transmission of HIV. Id.) See also
Lasser v. Rosa, 654 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823-24 (App. Div. 1997) (finding no evidence that referral to
specialized dental clinic for persons with HIV for performance of a molar extraction was a pretext
for discrimination).
39. See supra.text accompanying notes 25-34.
40. See Robert J. Weyant et al., Desire to Treat HIY.Infected Patients: Similarities and Differences Across Health Care Professions, 8 AIDS 117 (1994); Charles J. Curry et al., Willingness
of Health-Profession Students to Treat Patients with AIDS, 65 ACAD. MED. 472 (1990); see also
John Gibeaut, Lawyers are Drilling Home the Point that Dentists Who Won't Treat HIV Patients
may be Practicing the Most Pervasive Discrimination ofAll, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 48 (reporting
on survey published by the American Journal of Public Health).
The Department of Justice has undertaken a number of enforcement actions under Title
41.
III of the ADA against providers alleged to have refused treatment on the basis of a patient's
disability. For example, in March 1998, the Justice Department reached an agreement settling a
complaint against George Washington University Hospital. The settlement requires the hospital to
take a number of steps to ensure that persons with HIV or other infectious diseases are not denied
treatment or treated inappropriately. See GWU Hospital Settles AIDS Suit, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
1998, at B7; Justice Department GW University Hospital Reach Accord on Treatment ofAIDS
Patients, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Mar. 11, 1998. See also United States v. Neurological Surgery Inc., No. 00-CV-26 (N.D. Okla. filed 1/10/00) (alleging that neurosurgeons refused to treat
an individual with HIV), reported at Department of Justice, Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report,
January-March 2000, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/janmar00.htm>.
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tection of the right of an individual not to be denied access to medical
treatment based on disability has also come into play in cases involving
individuals with other disabilities, including hearing impairments and
Alzheimer's disease.42 And for the person who might be turned away
from a doctor's office, dentist's office, or hospital because of a disability, this is a crucial protection that enables him to access health care
treatment necessary to preserve his life or health or to increase his functioning. 43
B. Failureto Provide Auxiliary Aids
After flat refusals to provide care and pretextual referrals based on
disability, the next most obvious violation of the ADA in the health care
context is the failure of a provider covered by the ADA to provide auxiliary aids or services necessary to ensure that an individual with a disability is not "excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated
differently than other individuals. '" 4 The ADA requires hospitals and
health care professionals' offices to ensure effective communication
with individuals with disabilities, and a patient (or possibly a family
member of a patient) who is denied necessary auxiliary aids has a claim
of disability discrimination under the ADA.45
A failure to provide auxiliary aids could act to exclude or segregate
individuals with hearing impairments in many public accommodations
settings, but the effect of such a failure is particularly pernicious in a
health care setting because of the vital importance of timely, accurate,
and confidential communication to the provision of effective medical
care. 46 Ineffective communication may result in delays in treatment,
42.
See Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995) (woman with Alzheimer's denied admission to nursing facility); Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1996)
(deaf woman denied prenatal care).
43.
Of course, the ADA's prohibition against refusal to treat based on disability does nothing
to protect individuals who are denied access to health care not because of their disability, but
because they do not have health insurance coverage and cannot pay for care. See infra Part IV
(regarding the ADA's applicability to health insurance).
44.
42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1994) (including such a failure in the ADA's definition
of"discrimination"). Examples of auxiliary aids include:
Qualified interpreters, notetakers, computer-aided transcription services, written
materials, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assisted listening systems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, open
and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD's), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials
available to individuals with hearing impairments.
28 C.F.R. § 36.303(bXl) (1999).
45.
Depending on who the provider is, the individual may also have a claim under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Regulations issued under Section 504 require hospitals receiving
federal financial assistance to provide auxiliary aids under some circumstances, see 45 C.F.R. §
84.52(c), (d)(1) (1999), but do not speak to the provision of aids in an office setting.
46. See Elizabeth E. Chilton, Ensuring Effective Communication: The Duty of Health Care
Providers to Supply Sign Language Interpretersfor DeafPatients, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 873
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failures to obtain informed consent, and misdiagnoses. For example, in
4 7 a hospital failed to provide a
the case of Aikins v. St. Helena Hospital,
deaf woman with a sign language interpreter following her husband's
heart attack.4' As a result, medical personnel were not able to communicate effectively with the woman and did not learn until the day after the
heart attack how much time had elapsed between the attack and the
commencement of CPR 49 Unfortunately, such instances do not appear to
be unusual. A survey published in 1995 found that, while a majority of

the doctors surveyed understood the appropriateness of using sign language interpreters in communicating with their deaf patients, only a minority of the doctors actually used interpreters. 50

As with cases involving denials of access, because of the ADA's
relative clarity on the topic and the obvious negative impact on individual patients, courts have been willing to give some teeth to the ADA's
requirement of auxiliary aids in the health care setting. 51 These teeth are
dulled somewhat, however, by an absence of precise rules in the ADA
regarding the provision of auxiliary aids and the availability of an "undue burden" defense for public accommodations.5 2 What auxiliary aids
are "necessary to ensure" that an individual with a disability is not excluded or segregated is a question of fact, 53 as is the availability of the

(1996).
47. 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
48. Aikns, 843 F. Supp. at 1332.
49. Id. at 1331-32.
50. See David A. Ebert & Paul S. Heckerling, Communication with DeafPatients:Knowledge, Beliefs, andPracticesofPhysicians, 273 JAMA 227 (1995).
51. See, e.g., Naiman v. New York Univ., 1997 WL 249970, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that
plaintiff stated a claim of disability discrimination in his allegation that defendant hospital failed
to provide a qualified interpreter); Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(granting injunction requiring that mental health services be provided by counselors with sign
language ability); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (denying
physician's motion for summary judgment in action by deaf woman alleging physician's refusal to
provide interpreter services in the future and termination of medical care); Cf. Anderson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (denying plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment on claim that Medicaid HMOs failed to provide all information in alternative
formats; issues of fact remained regarding effectiveness of communication provided); Aikins, 843
F. Supp. at 1333, 1339 (denying plaintiff's ADA action for injunctive relief based on lack of
standing, but finding plaintiff entitled to compensatory relief under § 504).
52.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1994) states that "discrimination" includes:
[A] failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with
a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently
than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless
the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.
53. See, e.g., Anderson, 1 F. Supp.2d at 466 (concluding that whether verbal assistance was a
sufficiently effective means of communicating presented an issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment); Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp.2d 820, 827 (D. Md. 1998)
("Neither the precedents nor the regulations, however, establish a per se rule that sign language
interpreters are necessary in hospital settings.").
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undue burden defense. 54 As a result, plaintiffs alleging a failure to provide auxiliary aids are unlikely to prevail on summary judgment except
in the clearest of cases.
An additional stumbling block for plaintiffs claiming a denial of
auxiliary aids has been the limited relief available under Title III. Because a private plaintiff suing under Title III can obtain only injunctive,
and not compensatory relief,5 the plaintiff has to satisfy standing requirements. 56 A number of courts have dismissed claims based on lack
of standing because of the plaintiff's inability to show that the injury
complained of would likely occur again in the future.57 Thus, a deaf person who is discriminated against by a public accommodation's failure to
provide auxiliary aids on a single, isolated occasion may not be able to
receive any relief under the ADA. 58 This barrier may be particularly
problematic in ADA actions brought against a hospital, where care is
often provided to patients admitted for acute or emergency care and
who, consequently, cannot show they will need auxiliary aids from the
hospital on an ongoing basis.
Because of the standing issues that may arise in private actions, the
auxiliary aids provisions of Title III have proven particularly well suited
to public enforcement actions brought by the Department of Justice or a
U.S. Attorney. For example, in DeVinney v. Maine Medical Center,59 the

U.S. Attorney for the District of Maine and a private plaintiff sued
Maine's largest hospital for failing to provide auxiliary aids to deaf and
hard of hearing individuals. 60 The parties entered into a consent decree
requiring the hospital to provide qualified sign language interpreters,
assistive listening and telecommunication devices, captioned televisions
and other similar aids and services to hearing impaired individuals and
54. See Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment for hearing impaired inmate who alleged that prison's failure to provide a sign
language interpreter during medical care, inter alia, violated the ADA and remanding for consideration of whether provision of an interpreter would be a reasonable accommodation or would
impose an undue burden).
55. 'See Aikins, 843 F. Supp. at 1338 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993) and
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1994)). By contrast, a plaintiff suing under Section 504 can recover
compensatory damages. See id. at 1338-39 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (West 1985)).
56. As articulated by the Supreme Court, in order to establish standing, a plaintiff must show
that she has suffered an injury in fact (a violation of a legally protected interest) that is both concrete and particularized and either actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). The plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must face a threat of present or future
harm from the illegal conduct. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983).
57.
See, e.g., Aikins, 843 F. Supp. at 1338 (dismissing ADA claims for lack of standing);
Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 186 F.R.D. 293, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing ADA claims
for lack of standing); Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820 (D. Md. 1998)
(same).
58.
The plaintiff may pursue compensatory damages under Section 504, though, if the provider is a hospital subject to 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(c)-(d)(1) (1999).
59.
1998 WL 271495 (D. Me. 1998).
60.
1998 WL 271495 at *1.
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setting forth extensive rules governing the hospital's provision of auxiliary aids.6 Such actions take the focus away from the harm threatened
to a particular individual with a disability and can provide an effective
mechanism for compelling a health care provider to conform its practices more broadly to the ADA's auxiliary aids requirements.6 2
C. Different Treatment
Once we stop talking about a health care provider's outright refusal
to treat an individual with a disability or refusal to provide auxiliary aids
and start looking instead at claims of discrimination in the form of differential treatment, the ADA's impact on the treatment of individuals
with disabilities becomes much less clear. As discussed above, the analytical framework for a claim that a provider effectively closed the door
in a patient's face is fairly straightforward. Courts are much less comfortable, by contrast, grappling with the claim of a person with a disability that she received treatment from a provider, but that the treatment
was different from and inferior to the treatment provided to other patients without the plaintiff's disability.
It was this type of claim of discriminatory treatment choices that the
Second Circuit rejected in the University Hospital63 case. In that case,
the government basically argued that the hospital failed to provide corrective surgery for an infant born with spina bifida and microcephaly
and that the decision not to provide the surgery discriminated against the
infant based on handicap in violation of Section 504. 4 Ordinarily, to
prove a case of discrimination, the government would seek to put on
evidence that the hospital treated other individuals, who are similarly
situated except for the suspect trait, differently from the individual with
the trait. The analytical difficulty arises, of course, because only infants
who have spina bifida need surgery to correct an imperfect closure of
the spinal column. How can we meaningfully compare the treatment of
the infant with spina bifida with the treatment provided to her non61.
Id. at *1,*3.
62.
Public enforcement actions have also been brought, for example, against a group of acute
care hospitals in Connecticut, see Connecticut Ass'n of the Deaf v. Middlesex Mem'l Hosp.,
described in Department of Justice, Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report, April - June 1998 available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/aprun98.htm>, an obstetrics group that had failed to provide auxiliary aids for a deaf expectant father, see Drew v. Merrill, described in Department of
Justice, Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report, Oct. - Dec. 1999 available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/octdec99.htm>, and a group of neurologists, see Neurologic Institute of the Gulf Coast, described in id. In addition, in People by Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med.
Group, 877 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court held that the State of New York had parens
patriae standing to sue a medical clinic for violating the ADA by refusing to provide sign language interpreters for patients with hearing impairments. Vacco, 877 F. Supp. at 149.
63. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984).
64. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 148.
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disabled counterpart? It was based in part on this reasoning that the Second Circuit flatly concluded that Section 504 did not apply to medical
treatment decisions for disabled infants.6 5
The Second Circuit's reasoning and conclusion in University Hospital have cast a long shadow over the application of disability discrimination law to medical decision-making, and some courts continue to emphasize the need to defer to medical judgment in this arena. 66 There is
some force to the argument that it is simply too complex to try to determine what role disability plays in a particular treatment decision, particularly when the condition needing treatment is somehow related to the
disability itself. After all, it seems nonsensical to say that a physician
cannot take a patient's disability into account at all in deciding how to
treat a disability-related condition. Undoubtedly, the existence of a disability and its medical effects can be a legitimate factor in choosing appropriate medical treatment. Notwithstanding the legitimacy of
considering disability in some cases, however, in other instances
disability should be deemed an illegitimate consideration, as several
examples will illustrate.
Imagine an oncologist who routinely recommends surgical resection
for patients whose lung cancer is discovered at an early stage, but when
a blind person is diagnosed with early-stage lung cancer, the oncologist
recommends only chemotherapy, a less effective therapy for that cancer. 67 Assuming that the patient's visual impairment has nothing to do
with his cancer and that the patient has no other comorbidities that
would make surgery ill advised, the oncologist's choice would appear to
be an illegitimate choice to treat that patient differently based on the
patient's disability. Such a discriminatory choice ought to be covered by
65.
Id. at 161. The Second Circuit reached this conclusion after attempting to construe Section 504's "otherwise qualified" language in this context and finding that "the phrase cannot be
applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions without distorting its
plain meaning." Id. at 156. Title III of the ADA, by contrast, does not require that the individual
with a disability somehow be "qualified" to receive the goods and services of a place of public
accommodation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994). Professor Susan Stefan aptly notes the hidden danger in this type of reasoning when she states: "Oppressive and disadvantageous treatment
based on a disfavored characteristic becomes virtually invisible to the extent that there is no comparison group." Susan Stefan, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct andMental Health Law: Issues
for the Twenty-First Century, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 131, 145 (1999).
66. See, e.g., Lesley v. Chie, 81 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing University
Hospitalas supplying the rationale for giving deference to medical treatment decisions); Toney v.
United States Healthcare Inc., 838 F. Supp. 201, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that "a determination by a physician of when her regular patient's condition warrants an additional office visit is a
medical treatment decision not subject to judicial review").
67. This hypothetical is drawn from a published study showing the effect of race on surgical
treatment for lung cancer. See Peter B. Bach et al., Racial Differences in the Treatment of EarlyStage Lung Cancer, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1198 (1999) (finding that black patients received
surgical resection 12.7% less frequently than white patients). According to the study, for patients
diagnosed with non-small-cell lung cancer at an early stage, surgical resection offers a 40%
chance of surviving 5 years or longer Id. Patients whose cancer is discovered at a later stage or
who do not have the surgery have a medical survival of less than one year. Id.
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the ADA.
Similarly, consider the case of Sandra Jensen, a woman with Down
syndrome who developed a need for a heart and lung transplant. Both
Stanford University Hospital and UC San Diego initially refused to put
her on a waiting list for the transplant because the transplant surgeons
believed that a person with Down syndrome lacked the mental capacity
to survive the post-transplantation regimen.68 After the case received
attention from the press and advocacy groups and the Department of
Justice noted the possibility of an ADA violation, 69 though, the surgeons
reassessed Jensen's candidacy based on her own individual ability to
handle the regimen. 70 Based on that assessment, they placed her on the
waiting list. 71 Only days after being put on the waiting list at Stanford,
Sandra Jensen became the first person with Down syndrome to receive a
heart-lung transplant. 72 In this situation, the transplant surgeons initially
viewed Jensen's disability as related to her suitability as a transplant
candidate. That view, however, was based on their blanket assumptions
regarding the abilities of all persons with a particular disability. Once
the surgeons employed the approach prescribed by the ADA, an individualized assessment of the particular individual's abilities and needs,
their view of the situation changed. 73
Finally, let us imagine a woman with HIV infection who visits an
otolaryngologist (an "ear, nose, throat" doctor) complaining of severe
pain in one ear. The doctor diagnoses a perforated ear and faces a choice
between two possible treatment options: surgical repair of the perforation versus the administration of prophylactic antibiotics to ward off
infection while the ear heals on its own. While this doctor typically recommends surgical repair for patients with a.perforated ear, upon learn68.
See Down Syndrome Woman Denied Organ Transplant, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Aug. 12, 1995, at A19, availablein 1995 WL 5294339.
69.
See David A. Sylvester, About-Face on Organ Transplant, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Jan. 19, 1996, at F16, available in 1996 WL 3211591; Judy Tachibana, Alliance Drive Seeks to
Register Organ Donors, LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS, Oct. 29, 1995, at N6, availablein 1995 WL
5424624; Celeste Fremon, LOS ANGELES TIMES MAGAzINE, Apr. 14, 1996, at 18, available in
1996 WL 5259970.
70. See After Five Month Battle, Down Syndrome PatientMay Be Placed on UCSD Wait List
forHeart-Lung Transplant,TRANSPLANT NEWS, Dec. 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10121024.
71. See David A. Sylvester, About-Face on Organ Transplant/Stanfordto Help Woman Who
Has Down Syndrome, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 19, 1996, at F16, available in 1996 WL
3211591.
72. See John Wildermuth, Transplantfor Woman with Down Syndrome/Heart-Lung Surgery
Called a Landmark, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL
3211891.
73. For in-depth discussions of the application of disability discrimination law to the allocation of organs for transplantation, see Angela T. Whitehead, Rejecting Organs: The OrganAllocation Process and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 481 (1998); David
Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination
Against the Sick, 31 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 49 (1996); Karen J. Merrikin &
Thomas D. Overcast, Patient Selection for Heart Transpiantation:When is a Discriminating
Choice Discrimination?,10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 7 (1985).
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ing of the patient's HIV infection, he recommends the antibiotic course
of treatment.7 4 Is this consideration of the patient's disability in making
a treatment choice legitimate?
The answer in this situation must be "It depends." Specifically, it
depends on the reasoning behind the physician's choice of treatments. If
the doctor based his recommendation on his judgment (supported by
current medical science) that the greater risk of infection caused by surgery is not in the medical best interests of a person with HIV infection,
that would seem to be a legitimate consideration of disability in medical
decision-making.7 5 By contrast, if the doctor believed that surgery was
in the patient's best interests, but recommended antibiotic treatment out
of the fear of the small and avoidable risk of patient-to-doctor transmission during surgery, that would seem to be an illegitimate consideration
of disability. 76
The "it depends" analysis required in a case like this demonstrates
the inadequacy of an approach that would state either that any
consideration of disability in medical decision-making is illegitimate or
that providers' treatment decisions are always beyond the scrutiny of the
disability discrimination laws. Determining what role disability plays in
medical decision-making may well continue to challenge courts, but the
examples provided demonstrate that there may be instances when disability plays a role that is clearly inconsistent with both the philosophy
74.
This hypothetical scenario is based loosely on the facts of Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp.
632 (D. Mass. 1991). See also Amir Halevy, AIDS, Surgery, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 135 ARCIVES OF SURGERY 51 (2000) (reporting anecdotally the decisions of specialists who
routinely perform invasive diagnostic tests, but who decide that non-invasive radiological studies
should be done on patients with HIV, and the decisions of surgeons that surgery is not necessary
upon learning that a patient has HIV infection).
75.
The more difficult question would arise if the patient, notwithstanding the doctor's belief
that antibiotic treatment was in the patient's best interest, chose to accept the greater risk of infection and demanded that the doctor perform the surgery. In Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F. Supp. 1461
(N.D. Ga. 1997), the court granted summary judgment to a doctor who refused to perform Goretex implant surgery (a type of cosmetic surgery) at the request of a patient with HIV infection.
Jairath,972 F. Supp. at 1470. The court accepted the doctor's defense that performing the surgery
would pose a "direct threat" to the plaintiff's own health, as opposed to the doctor's health. Id. A
split among the Circuit Courts of Appeal has recently developed on whether the "direct threat"
defense in the employment context should be construed to include threats to the health or safety of
the disabled plaintiff. Compare Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 213 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a direct threat that a job applicant posed to his own health or safety does
not give the employer an affirmative defense in an ADA action), with Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 447, 447-48 (1Ith Cir. 1996) (stating that the ADA's direct threat defense
applies to threats to the disabled individual himself). The ability of a patient with a disability to
demand a treatment that a physician believes is not in the patient's best interests also arises when
a physician refuses to provide treatment the physician believes is futile. See Philip G. Peters,
When PhysiciansBalk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability Rights Laws, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 798 (1997); Mary Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 179 (1995).
76.
This mirrors the situation in Abbott v. Bragdon and other cases in which the defendant
providers have unsuccessfully raised a "direct threat" defense. See supra text accompanying notes
25-34.
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and the language of the ADA. If that is the case, the challenge is to figure out how it makes sense to apply the ADA to medical treatment decision-making.
Since the passage of the ADA, several courts have recognized that
disability discrimination law may place some limits on the medical decisions of doctors and other health care providers. 77 Nonetheless, the law
remains far from clear regarding the application of disability discrimination law to medical decision-making. This lack of resolution is likely
due in part to the relative scarcity of cases litigated on this question.
This scarcity is not surprising, because unless the differential treatment
experienced by a person with a disability rises to the level of a denial of
treatment or the patient is particularly sophisticated regarding her medical options, the pafient is unlikely ever to realize that, because of her
disability, she is being treated differently and less favorably in the medical advice and treatment she is receiving. 78
Notwithstanding the small number of litigated cases, how the ADA
applies to medical treatment decisions is an important question, and it
may become more important in the future if the responsibility for containing health care costs is increasingly left in the hands of providers
facing financial incentives to provide less care rather than more. In that
scenario, persons with disabilities may be particularly likely to receive
suboptimal, but less expensive, medical treatments, and they may be
more likely than other patients to be denied treatment altogether. This
linkage between medical decision-making and cost containment presents

77. See, e.g., Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F. Supp; 1461 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("Use of caution in making
medical decisions is to be distinguished from situations in which doctors blatantly discriminate
against patients."); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78, 79, n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that
"[d]iscrimination in public accommodation can take the form of the . . .provision of unequal
medical benefits based upon the disability," but declining to address whether a provider considering whether to refer a patient to another provider "may properly consider an individual's disability
when that disability complicates the medical condition for which the individual is seeking treatment"); Lesley v. Chic, 81 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224-25 (D.Mass. 2000) (citing to UniversityHospital
and explaining rationale behind deference to medical decisions, but proceeding to scrutinize carefully facts underlying physician's claim of a nondiscriminatory basis for referral); Sharrow v.
Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 192 (M.D.Pa. 1995) (finding that HIV-positive plaintiff's claim that
orthopedic surgeon conditioned performance of surgery on the use of safeguards exceeding those
recommended by the CDC stated a claim for violation of the ADA); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F.
Supp. 632, 638 (D. Mass. 1991) (stating that courts' unquestioning deference to doctors' medical
judgments "would completely eviscerate § 504's function of preventing discrimination against the
disabled in the health-care context"); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (involving allegation that doctor discriminated by his failure to authorize HIV-positive
plaintiff's visit to emergency room, in which the court concluded, inter alia, that a managed care
enrollee with a disability is otherwise qualified for medical benefits "if there is no factor apart
from the mere existence of disability that renders the [enrollee] unqualified for the benefit").
78.
A significant number of patients are reluctant to participate actively in medical decisionmaking and instead trust their health care provider to make decisions regarding care and treatment
for them. Cf CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND
MEDICAL DECISIONS 47-49 (1998) (citing the complexity of medical decisions and the doctors'
relative expertise and authority as reasons for this behavior).
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a good bridge to discussing the ADA's applicability to health care costcontainment measures.

III. THE ADA AND COST CONTAINMENT EFFORTS
In this part, the focus shifts away from cases alleging a denial of
treatment or the differential treatment of individual patients and toward
the ADA's application to cost-containment measures employed systemically. Accordingly, this part will examine claims, not that an individual
was singled out for different treatment because of a disability, but that a
practice or policy that applies to everyone has a discriminatory impact
on people with disabilities. The ADA clearly contemplates reaching at
least some forms of disparate impact discrimination by recognizing that
physical, social, or economic structures may create barriers or disadvantages for people with disabilities and that a failure to take reasonable
steps to remove those barriers or remedy those disadvantages should be
deemed to be discrimination.7 9
The ADA's explicit recognition of so-called "structural discrimination"' can create some difficult line-drawing questions. One such question is just how clear must the discriminatory effect of a structure or a
practice be before the law imposes any obligation to remedy the barriers
or disadvantage. That was the real question the Supreme Court dealt
with in addressing the fourteen-day limitation on hospitalization coverage in Alexander v. Choate"1 : Does the greater disadvantage that the
limit imposes on disabled Medicaid beneficiaries mean that the limit is
discriminatory in a legally actionable way?
This type of question has come up a number of times in cases challenging cost-control measures employed by either public or private payers for health care, such as state Medicaid programs and managed care
plans. The ten years following the ADA's enactment were also the decade in which health care policy-makers (public and private) sought to
slay the evil dragon of double-digit health care cost inflation, largely by
adopting managed care methodologies. For a while, in the mid-1990s, it
appeared that these efforts were largely successful, with health care cost

79.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994) (stating that discrimination includes "the
imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual
with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities" from use or enjoyment of a public
accommodation) and § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that discrimination includes "a failure to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary" to afford people with disabilities the use or enjoyment of public accommodations).
80.
I borrow this phrase from Michael A. Rebell, StructuralDiscriminationand the Rights of
the Disabled,74 GEO. L.J. 1435 (1986).
81.
469 U.S. 287. 299 (1985) ("[W]e must . . . determine whether the disparate effect of
which respondents complain is the sort of disparate impact that federal law might recognize").
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increases in the private sector limited to the single digits8 and the major
government programs, Medicare and Medicaid, rushing to jump on the
managed care bandwagon.13 But in the past few years, major managed
care companies have lost money, throwing into question the ability of
managed care to place any kind of sustained limits on health care cost
inflation.84
So the dragon is still alive, if temporarily subdued, and I think that,
as a society, we are going to have to continue to try to figure out how we
can hold health care costs to a manageable level, without unduly compromising people's access to good, quality health care services. How we
answer this question has huge implications for people with disabilities, a
substantial number of whom are disproportionately heavy users of health
care services. This part will examine the implications of the ADA for
cost-containment efforts by addressing first some of the issues associated with managed care and then touching briefly on the ADA's application to health care rationing programs.
A. The ADA Meets ManagedCare
When we discuss managed care practices, it may be helpful to think
about managed care as standing in contrast to the "good old days" of
fee-for-service medicine. A sketch of the basic contours of fee-forservice medicine would look something like this: Before the advent of
widespread managed care, most individuals who had private health insurance enjoyed fairly comprehensive coverage (typically provided by
an employer) that allowed the insured to visit any doctor he chose'at his
own initiative. The insurance company would pay the doctor (or reimburse the insured) a separate fee for each service that the doctor provided to the insured. Physicians and patients generally liked this system,
which maximized physician income and patient choice, but the system
82.
Congressional Budget Office, CBO Paper: Trends in Health Care Spending by the Private Sector (Apr. 1997) at ix available at <http://www.cbo.gov/byclasscat.cfm?class=O&cat=9>
(reporting that "the annual growth rate of private health insurance expenditures tumbled from
around 14 percent in 1990 to less than 3 percent in 1994 and 1995").
83. In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress created Medicare+Choice, Medicare Part
C, which allows Medicare beneficiaries a dramatically broader choice of types of managed care
plans to enroll in as an alternative to remaining in Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program.
42 U.S.C. 1395w-21 (Supp. IV 1998). The legislation also contains provisions seeking to attract
managed care organizations to participate in Medicare. See Lynn Etheredge, The Medicare Reforms of 1997: Headlines You Didn't Read, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 573 (1998). The
Balanced Budget Act also loosened the criteria by which states could require Medicaid recipients
to enroll in managed care plans. 42 U.S.C. 1396u-2 (Supp. IV 1998). Even prior to this loosening,
Medicaid managed care enrollment expanded rapidly in the 1990s, rising from 2.7 million enrollees in 1991 to 16.8 million by the end of 1998. See Barry R. Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW 613
(2000).
84. See Eli Ginzberg, The UncertainFuture ofManaged Care, 340 NEW ENO. J.MED. 144
(1999).
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proved to be quite expensive.
The basic idea of managed care is that the medical care provided to
a patient should be managed so that unnecessary and non-beneficial care
will not be provided, and so that the care that is medically necessary will
be provided in the most cost-effective manner or setting possible. In
theory, reducing the amount of unnecessary care provided will not only
decrease costs, but will also improve the quality of care received by patients. In reality, the techniques used to manage care can sometimes result in the delay or denial of needed care, a risk that is magnified for
individuals with greater than average medical needs.
One broad method of managing care is for a third-party payer to use
administrative limits on a patient's ability to access expensive care.' 5
For example, many managed care companies will require a patient to
obtain pre-authorization from the payer for any surgery or hospitalization, or will require that all visits to a specialist be authorized by the
patient's primary care provider ("PCP").8 6 It is easy to imagine how
such administrative constraints might adversely affect individuals with
disabilities that require extensive medical care.17 Imagine a man with a
chronic medical condition like diabetes, which may be most effectively
managed by an endocrinologist. But the patient cannot simply make an
appointment with the endocrinologist when health issues arise. Instead,
in many managed care systems, the patient will have to obtain a referral
from his PCP for each visit. Imposing this extra step can operate as a
real barrier to accessing care in a timely and effective fashion.
In addition to administrative limits on accessing care, a managed
care payer may also employ provider reimbursement methods that create
financial incentives for providers to manage care. From the perspective
of managed care proponents, these incentives encourage providers to
practice medicine in a cost-conscious manner. From the perspective of
managed care detractors, these incentives encourage providers to limit
the care provided to patients. For example, to carry on the example provided above, the managed care company's payments to the PCP may be
limited or decreased if the PCP makes "excessive" referrals to specialists.
Another common type of financial incentive is for the managed care
entity to pay physicians on a capitation basis for caring for the plan's
enrollees. Rather than paying the physician separately for each service
rendered, the plan pays the physician a fixed sum of money to provide
85.
For the Supreme Court's recent brief description of managed care methodologies, see Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).
86.
See generally Pegram, 120 S.Ct. at 22-26.
87. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Doctors Battle Over Who Treats Chronically Il, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 11, 1996, at B1.

2000]

The ADA's Impact on Health Care

all necessary care for a managed care enrollee for a set period of time. 88
The plan then leaves it to the physician to determine what care is necessary and how to provide it in a cost-effective fashion.89 The risk that
capitation reimbursement poses is that if a physician is treating a particularly expensive patient (i.e., one whose medical costs significantly
exceed the capitation payment) the physician may be faced with either
effectively paying for the excess care out of his own pocket or not recommending beneficial medical treatment. 9° Of course, a possible
alternative to losing money or skimping on care would be for the
physician to attempt to avoid altogether entering into relationships with
patients with expensive medical conditions, a group that may overlap
significantly with persons with disabilities. 91
The possibility that managed care practices may disproportionately
affect people with disabilities has not been lost on advocates for disability rights. In a handful of cases over the past several years, disabled patients have challenged managed-care type reimbursement practices as
having a discriminatory impact on them in violation of the ADA. For
example, in one case patients alleged that financial arrangements between a health maintenance organization ("HMO") and a physician
group caused disabled patients to be more expensive to physicians than
other patients and thereby violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act. 92 The plaintiffs claimed that the financial arrangements led the physicians to make disabled patients wait a long time for care or to deny
them care altogether, which then forced the patients to seek care from
other providers.9 Based on these allegations, a district court in Texas
found that the plaintiffs had stated a claim of disability-related discrimination caused by the financial relationship between the HMO and the
doctors. 94
In another case, individuals with disabilities whose home health care
was paid for by Medicare sued a home health agency under the Rehabilitation Act for "dumping" them. 95 They claimed that a change in Medicare's reimbursement rules that capped the amount that the agency
88.

See Barbara C. Colombo & Robert P. Webber, Regulating Risk in a ManagedCareEnvi-

ronment: Theory vs. Practice, The Minnesota Experience, 8 ANNALs HEALTH L. 147, 155-56
(1999).

89.

See id.

90. See generally Frances H. Miller, Foreword: The Promise and Problems of Capitation, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 167 (1996).
91. See Sandra J. Tanenbaum & Robert E. Hurley, Disabilityand the Managed Care Frenzy:
A CautionaryNote, 14 HEALTH AFFAIRS Winter 1995, at 213; Cf John V. Jacobi, Canariesin the
Coal Mine: the ChronicallyIll in Managed Care, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 79 (1999) (describing the
dual dangers of excluding and stinting that face the chronically ill in managed care).
92.
Zamora-Quezada v. HealthTexas Med: Group of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D.
Tex. 1998).
93.
Zamora-Quezada,34 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38.
94. Id. at 446.
95.
Winkler v. Interim Services, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (M.D. Tenn. 1999).
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would be paid for providing them services led the agency to abandon
them because they were "heavy service users and economically undesirable patients." 96 A district court in Tennessee found that these allegations stated a claim of discrimination based on the severity of the plaintiffs' disabilities and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim.97
Scholars have long been concerned that the administrative and reimbursement practices employed by managed care would create substantial
barriers for people with disabilities being able to access and receive necessary medical services. The cases described suggest a budding recognition by the courts that if the barriers erected by managed care are disproportionately greater for people with disabilities than for members of
the general population, that disproportion may form the basis of a disability discrimination claim.
Ironically, though, while the application of managed care techniques
to people with disabilities might at times give rise to a cause of action,
the failure to include people with disabilities in managed care programs
can also be challenged as violating disability discrimination law. Here
the claim has been that the exclusion from a managed care program constitutes different treatment based on disability. This claim has come up
in the context of the Medicaid program, the joint federal-state program
providing medical assistance to certain categories of poor persons
(namely, women and children, the aged, and the disabled). In the early
to mid 1990s, many states started experimenting with enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans, rather than paying for their
care on a fee-for-service basis. 98 These early attempts to save money for
state governments were typically confined to women and children beneficiaries. Elderly and disabled Medicaid beneficiaries generally were not
switched to managed care because of concerns about whether managed
care could address the more complex medical needs of those populations. 99
By and large, because of their fears of the barriers imposed by managed care, Medicaid enrollees with disabilities have not objected to their
exclusion from Medicaid managed care experiments. Nonetheless,
96.
Winkler, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
97.
Id. at 1030. Accord Morris v. North Hawaii Community Hosp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189
(D. Haw. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction preventing the termination of home health benefits except in compliance with Medicare rules and state laws).
98.
See John K. Iglehart, Medicaid andManaged Care, 332 NEw ENG. J.MED. 1727 (1995);
Mary Crossley, Medicaid Managed Care and DisabilityDiscriminationIssues, 65 TENN. L. REV.
419, 420 (1998) (reporting that as of June 1996, forty percent of Medicaid enrollees nationwide
were enrolled in some form of managed care).
99.

See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: SERVING THE DISABLED

CHALILENoES STATE PROGRAMs 12 (1996) available at <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/gao/index.html>
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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Medicaid managed care enrollment may be advantageous for some individuals with disabilities, for it may offer more comprehensive coverage,
better access to physicians, better continuity of care, or more liberal financial eligibility requirements. 1 In such a case, blind and disabled
plaintiffs successflly sued the State of Hawaii for violating the ADA
when it excluded them from participating in its Medicaid managed care
program.'0 The court in that case found that the plaintiffs had been
categorically denied coverage under the managed care branch of Hawaii's Medicaid program solely by reason of their disabilities.'02 Since the mid 1990s, the states have increasingly sought to enroll
some portion of their disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in some form of
managed care. Spurring this movement has been not a fear of liability
for disability discrimination, but the states' recognition that Medicaid
managed care cannot reap significant cost savings for the states unless it
is applied to the most costly Medicaid recipients.10 3 As state policymakers consider how to include people with disabilities in Medicaid
managed care programs, however, disability discrimination law may
appear to present them with a "damned if you do, damned if you don't"
dilemma, much as it does private managed care plans. For the ADA may
have a double-edged application to issues involving managed care and
persons with disabilities. If a state enrolls disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in the same managed care program as nondisabled beneficiaries (or if
a private plan subjects disabled enrollees to the same managed care
practices), it may face a claim of disparate impact discrimination because the managed care practices may be found to have a disproportionately adverse impact on persons with disabilities. On the other hand,
though, if the state excludes disabled Medicaid beneficiaries from its
managed care program (or a private plan refuses to issue a managed care
coverage to a disabled applicant), it may be subject to a claim of different treatment.
From the perspective of persons with disabilities and their advocates, though, managed care companies and state health care policy100. See Tanenbaum & Hurley, supra note 91, at 215-16; Cf. Stefan, supra note 65, at 164
(noting mixed feelings among mental health lawyers regarding enrollment in managed mental
health care programs).
101. Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler, 939 F. Supp. 765 (D. Haw. 1996). The exclusion disadvantaged plaintiffs in this case because Hawaii had established more stringent financial eligibility
requirements for its traditional fee-for-service Medicaid program (which covered disabled persons) than for its Medicaid managed care program. As a result, plaintiffs were not financially
eligible for the traditional program, but would have qualified for the managed care program but
for their disability. Burns-Vidlak, 939 F. Supp. at 771.
102. Burns-Vidlak, 939 F. Supp. at 771.
103. See Crossley, supra note 98, at 422 (citing Katherine R. Levit et al., Data View: National
Health Expenditures, 1994, 17 HEALTH CARE FiNANCING REv. 205, 224 (1996)); Cf GAO
REPoRT, supra note 99, at 14-15 (reporting that in 1994, disabled individuals constituted only
about 15% of Medicaid enrollees, butaccounted for 39% of Medicaid expenditures).
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makers are not in an untenable situation. Instead, those decision-makers
are in the exact position demanded by the ADA: They simply must take
the circumstances and needs of persons with disabilities into account in
deciding whether and how managed care methodologies should apply to
those persons. Upon such reflection, the decision-maker could validly
conclude that some persons with disabilities should be excluded from
managed care enrollment because the different medical needs of that
group requires the provision of a benefit that, in order to be equally effective, must be separate.' °4 Or the decision-maker could conclude that
persons with disabilities should be included in managed care enrollment,
but also carefully assess whether and how managed care practices
should be modified in order to avoid a discriminatory impact on those
persons.'0 5 The ADA does not compel health care decision-makers to
arrive at any particular substantive decision with respect to the application of managed care to persons with disabilities; what the law does do,
though, is compel decision-makers to take persons with disabilities into
account in their decisions. As a result, people with disabilities may be
less likely to find themselves enrolled in a plan that is oblivious to or
unaccommodating towards their health care needs.
Despite some of the recent faltering of the managed care industry,
managed care seems certain to remain a major feature of the health care
landscape in this country for the foreseeable future. Thus, figuring out
how the ADA may limit the application of managed care practices to
persons with disabilities is likely to be an ongoing conversation. On the
other hand, because managed care appears not to be the St. George that
slays the evil dragon of health care inflation, I think it likely that discussions of rationing health care as a way of containing costs will grow
more frequent. Based on the past decade of experience, how would the
ADA figure in these discussions?
B. The ADA and Health Care Rationing
The phrase "health care rationing" carries great political baggage
and negative connotations with it, but in essence it simply refers to a
process by which decisions are made regarding who will receive scarce
health care resources. Although it is not commonly acknowledged, some
form of de facto health care rationing has long existed in this country,
104. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (1999), which provides that a public entity may not, on
the basis of disability, "[pirovide different or separate aids, benefits, or services to individuals
with disabilities or to any class of individuals with disabilities than is [sic] provided to others
unless such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to other."
105. Cf. GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 38-41 (suggesting ways that managed care methodologies could be adapted to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities).
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with the primary determining factor for the receipt of health care resources being individual wealth. From time to time, scholars, policymakers, and politicians have engaged in spirited discussions regarding
other possible systems of explicit rationing, for example, rationing based
on need, rationing based on age, and rationing based on maximizing
benefit to recipients.
Shortly after the ADA's passage, one of the first attempts by policymakers in the United States to adopt an explicit rationing system directed widespread public attention to the potential connections between
the ADA and the health care system. For in 1992, the Federal Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") rejected an application for
a Medicaid waiver by the State of Oregon that would allow it to implement a rationing scheme as part of its Medicaid program. 1°6 The stated
reason for the rejection was the perceived conflict between the rationing
plan and the ADA. Although this Article will not retrace the detailed
steps by which Oregon developed its rationing scheme, 107 the central
criterion ultimately adopted by the State for which medical services
would be covered by its Medicaid program was the comparative benefit
that treatments for different conditions would provide to the population
of Oregon, and Oregon's citizenry had a voice-by use of telephone
surveys-in what would count as a benefit.
One reason that the Secretary of HHS gave for rejecting the plan
was that the use of public input and community values may have "quantifie[d] stereotypic assumptions" about the value of life with a disability
as compared to life without a disability .and that, as a consequence, the
resulting rankings may have devalued treatments that would save life,
but not return the patient to full functioning. 10 8 Although the Secretary
initially rejected Oregon's waiver application, he encouraged the State
to try again, pointing out that a number of factors were available for
making rationing decisions that would not run afoul of the ADA. Citing
Alexander v. Choate, he stated: "Oregon may consider, consistent with
the ADA, any content neutral factor that does not take disability into
account or that does not have a particular exclusionary effect on persons
106. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, to Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon (Aug. 3, 1992) (with accompanying three-page "Analysis Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") of the Oregon Reform Demonstration"), reprintedin
Timothy B. Flanagan, ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health CarePlan, 9 IsSUEs LAW & MED. 397,
409 (1994) [hereinafter Sullivan letter].
107. For a detailed account of the process, see Michael J. Garland, Rationing in Public: Oregon's Priority-Setting Methodology, in RATIONINO AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON

PLAN AND BEYOND 37 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., The Brookings Institution 1992).
108. The Secretary stated: "The record regarding the manner in which the list of condition/treatment pairs was compiled contains considerable evidence that it was based in substantial
part on the premise that the value of the life of a person with a disability is less than the value of
the life of a person without a disability. This is a premise which is inconsistent with the ADA."
Sullivan letter, supra note 106, at 410.
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with disabilities. '"'09 Because Oregon's rationing proposal already had
received a great deal of attention from both health policy-makers and the
general public, the Secretary's rejection of the plan based on ADA concerns spotlighted for many the potential impact of the statute on health
care resource allocation questions.
For several years following the rejection of Oregon's plan, scholars,
policy-makers, and commentators busily considered what limits, if any,
the ADA places on the ability of public and private payers to engage in
health care rationing." 0 Because many proposed rationing schemes
would allocate resources based on the benefits received from treatment
or some kind of cost-benefit analysis, the fundamental question that
emerged is which factors legitimately can be considered in assessing the
benefit to be obtained from medical treatment and which factors, by
contrast, would effectively discriminate against persons with disabilities
in violation of the ADA."' For example, does a rationing scheme discriminate based on disability if it gives priority in funding to a treatment
that statistically provides patients with seven additional years of life
with no functional impairment, over a treatment that provides seven additional years of life with impairments? Does the treatment of an unimpaired life as having superior benefit constitute unlawful discrimination
against persons with disabilities (persons who by definition are living
with impairments)?
These discussions, while stimulating, provided no clear answers to
the questions regarding the ADA's impact, and no case has yet been
litigated that poses these questions directly. And as the decade following
the ADA's enactment progressed, most health policy-makers and advocates for disability rights turned their attention away from explicit rationing schemes and focused instead on the issues posed by the growing
prevalence of managed care, so that the discussions languished somewhat. As it becomes increasingly apparent that managed care alone is
unlikely to curb health care inflation, discussions of possible rationing
approaches may well revive" 2 and again pose the question whether
109. Sullivan letter, supra note 106, at 411 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
110. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 271
JAMA 308 (1994); Philip G. Peters, Health Care Rationing andDisabilityRights, 70 IND. L.J. 491
(1995); James V. Garvey, Note, Health Care Rationing and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of
1990: What Protection Should the Disabled be Afforded?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581 (1993);
Nancy K. Stade, Note, The Use of Quality-of-Life Measures to Ration Health Care: Reviving a
Rejected Proposal, 93 COLuM. L. REV. 1985 (1993).
111. Cf Peters, supra note 110, at 492 ("Any health care allocation scheme which attempts to
maximize health care outcomes by giving priority to the most effective treatments has the potential to disfavor disabled patients and others, such as the elderly and the frail, whose quality of life
is most impaired or whose conditions are most resistant to cure.").
112. For examples of recent discussions of health care rationing in the law review literature,
see Candace J. Redden, Rationing Care in the Community: Engaging Citizens in Health Care
Decision Making, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1363 (1999); Mita K. Giacomini, The Which-
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health care can be rationed in a manner that both avoids disproportionately disadvantaging persons with disabilities and comports with broadly
accepted notions of distributive justice.
What role the ADA will ultimately play in such discussions is not
clear. The statute itself would provide an unambiguous answer only in
the grossest of cases, for example, a policy to allocate health care resources to individuals based on their existing level of physical and mental functioning, with priority being given to individuals with the highest
functioning, or a policy that expressly excluded individuals from the
receipt of health care resources on the basis of their disability. In most
rationing proposals, though, the distinctions are likely to be far more
subtle and the line-drawing questions more fine, so that the ADA is unlikely to provide any clear answers regarding the scheme's legitimacy.
What is probably most significant for the health of persons with disabilities, though, is that the ADA will play a role in the discussions.113 The
ADA again renders persons with disabilities visible and gives them leverage against any majoritarian impulses to place the burdens of health
care cost containment and rationing on the backs of the minority of persons with disabilities. It demands that their dignity as persons and their
health care needs be taken into account.
IV. THE ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE
The final facet of health care that this Article will undertake to examine the ADA's impact on is health insurance. What has the ADA's
non-discrimination mandate meant'in the context of health insurance for
people with disabilities? Now just to ask what that mandate means in the
context of health insurance is to pose a real conundrum, because a seemingly fundamental conflict exists between the ADA's purpose and commonly accepted practices in the health insurance industry. The ADA, of
course, basically says that public actors shall not discriminate based on
disability in employing individuals or in providing individuals with
goods, services, or benefits. But the ADA applies to health insurers and
to employers deciding what coverage to offer in employee benefit
Hunt: Assembling Health Technologiesfor Assessment andRationing, 24 J. HEALTH POL.; POL'Y
& L. 715 (1999); Arti K. Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis in Health Care,72 IND. L.J. 1015 (1997).
113. Health policy scholar Dr. David Hadorn recognized this even before HHS's rejection of
Oregon's waiver application. He wrote:
An equally formidable challenge to the implementation of utilitarian distributions of
health care has so far received much less attention: the problem of discriminationreal or apparent-against patients with disabilities.... iT]he 'D-word' threatens to
replace the 'R-word' (for rationing) as the most feared epithet in the field of resource allocation.
David C. Hadorn, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority Setting, 268 JAMA
1454 (1992).
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plans-entities who have traditionally made it their business on a routine basis to make decisions regarding the availability and nature of
benefits by taking into account individuals' health characteristics in a
fashion that could often be construed as discrimination on the basis of
disability. So how does one apply a nondiscrimination mandate to an
entity that says, in a sense, "it's our business to discriminate"?
To begin, the ADA clearly contemplates some application to health
insurance, whether an individual receives the insurance from an employer as a fringe benefit (in which case Title I may apply) 1 4 or whether
the individual purchases the insurance directly from an insurance company, whose office Title III explicitly includes in its list of public accommodations.1 5 In addition, Congress made express (though not terribly clear) reference to the ADA's applicability to insurance in Section
16
501(c) of the ADA, known as the "insurance safe harbor" provision.
One of the murkier provisions of the ADA," i7 the insurance safe harbor basically provides that the ADA shall not be construed to prohibit an
insurer from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks as are not inconsistent with state law, unless the practice is a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA. In other words, the ADA
does not prohibit an insurer from continuing to use risk classification or
underwriting practices allowed by state law, as long as those practices
are not a subterfuge to circumvent statutory purposes." 8 The meaning
and application of Section 501(c) have been the source of much confusion and the subject of much litigation, particularly over the past several
years, and the courts have reached mixed results, some of which will be
discussed below." 9 It is key to note, however, that Section 501(c) does
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a)-12112(b) (1994).
115. Id. § 12181(7XF).
116. Section 501(c) provides as follows:
(c) Insurance
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict (1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations
from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with State law; ....
Paragraphs (1) ... shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.
Id. § 12201(c).
117. Circuit Judge Merritt has described Section 501(c) as "purposefully vague" and "totally
ambiguous on its face." Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 190 (6th Cir. 1996),
vacated and rev'd, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
118. Cf Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The
plain meaning of Section 501(c) is that insurers are exempt from regulation under the ADA so
long as (i) their actions conform to state law, and (ii) they do not use the exemption as a 'subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]."').
119. Because of its focus on the ADA's impact on health care and health insurance for people
with disabilities, this Article will not discuss the extensive litigation challenging distinctions in
long-term disability insurance policies between coverage for physical disabilities and mental
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not conclude that the practices of the insurance industry do not discriminate based on disability; instead, the provision states only that the ADA
will not be construed to prohibit those practices.
Before discussing how courts have approached the ADA's application to health insurance, it is worth pausing to think about what disability discrimination by a health insurance provider might look like-how
it might be experienced by a person with a disability. Here, one can
imagine that discrimination could occur in the form of either an insurer's singling out an individual applicant or insured for different
treatment or the disparate impact of an insurer's practices on people
with disabilities as a group. One of the meatiest bones of contention
regarding the ADA's application to health insurance is the appropriate
breadth of the statute's coverage. Does the ADA provide redress only to
the individual with a disability who finds that an insurance office is
physically inaccessible?' 20 Or does it extend broadly to protect an individual who claims that a provision or limitation of coverage received
from an insurer disproportionately impacts people with disabilities, i.e.,
that the policy discriminates in its content? Or did Congress perhaps
intend some middle ground, allowing suit when an individual with a
disability alleges that an insurer discriminated against her in deciding
whether and on what terms to issue a health insurance policy, but not
when she alleges discrimination in the content of an issued policy?
In fact, courts have taken each of the positions just suggested, and
disabilities, except to note that it appears fairly well settled by the Courts of Appeal at this point
that the ADA does not prohibit such distinctions. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 n.68 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing seven Circuit Courts of Appeal that have
rejected such a claim); see also EEOC v. Staten Island Say. Bank, 207 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that distinction not prohibited by ADA). But see Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.N.H. 1999) (allowing claim based on such a distinction to proceed).
Moreover, I will not focus on the issues regarding the proper construction of the "subterfuge"
clause. Compare Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that "subterfuge" requires an intent to evade, so that plan provision adopted prior to ADA's passage cannot be a subterfuge), with Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422
(D.N.H. 1996) (finding that "subterfuge" need not be intentional, but may simply be a decision
not based on either sound actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated experience). The interaction of Titles I and III of the ADA with Section 501(c) has spawned sufficient litigation to merit
numerous articles on these topics. See, e.g., Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Insurance and the ADA, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 915 (1997); Luke A. Sobota, Comment, Does Title III of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct Regulate Insurance?, 66 U. Cim. L. REv. 243 (1999); Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities:The Different Treatment ofMental Versus PhysicalDisabilitiesin LongTerm DisabilityBenefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 361 (1998).
120. Cf Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A]n insurance
office must be physically accessible to the disabled but need not provide insurance that treats the
disabled equally with the non-disabled."); Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding Title III's applicability limited to actions related to the physical use of
a place of public accommodation). It is worth noting that, while the ADA specifically addresses
physical accessibility issues, see 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (1994), claims based on physical inaccessibility are by their nature in fact disparate impact claims. The person in a wheelchair who complains
about the lack of a ramp or elevator complains not that the public accommodation singled him out
for different treatment, but that its exclusive reliance on stairs disproportionately burdens wheelchair users.

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 52:1:51

the question remains far from judicial resolution. Although some courts
have been willing to scrutinize insurance practices to protect the interests of people with disabilities, the trend of the case law over the past
several years has been for courts to take a fairly hands-off approach,
allowing suits to proceed only when the plaintiff can show that he was
singled out for different treatment by an insured because of his disability. A recently decided case, Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 121
illustrates this approach.
In Doe, the plaintiffs challenged Mutual of Omaha's practice of employing AIDS caps in its health insurance policies: the company issued
policies that imposed both a general limit on lifetime benefits -of
$1,000,000 and a separate, lower limit of $25,000 (in the case of one
plaintiff) or $100,000 (in the case of the other) on coverage for treatment of AIDS or AIDS-related condition ("ARC").' 22 The plaintiffs'
argument was that, by imposing lower caps only with respect to treatment for the disabling condition AIDS, Mutual of Omaha was discriminating based on disability.123 Although the plaintiffs survived a motion
to dismiss in the district court,' 24 the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Posner, reversed the district court and granted the
motion.' 25 Some of his reasoning in doing so demonstrates the conceptual difficulties that courts encounter in applying the ADA to health insurance.
First, Judge Posner is careful to distinguish the plaintiffs' claim
from a claim that an insurance company had refused to issue a policy
based on disability or had charged higher premiums to an individual
based on disability.' 26 Such a claim would clearly constitute an allegation of different treatment, which the court assumed would fall within
the scope of Title III's requirement that public accommodations, including insurance companies, not deny individuals 'with disabilities the full
and equal enjoyment of their products and services.127 Instead, the court
pointed out, Mutual of Omaha sold policies to the plaintiffs, apparently
on the same terms and with the same coverage limitations provided to
other insureds-the policies were simply
less valuable to the plaintiffs
2
because of the cap on AIDS coverage. 1
121. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 845 (2000).
122. Doe, 179 F.3d at 558.
123. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Iil. 1998).
124. Doe, 999 F.Supp. at 1197-98.
125. Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.
126. Id. at 559.
127. Id. at 558-59; accord Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co. 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998)
(finding that insurer's policy of denying coverage to any applicant treated for a mental condition
within the past year violated the ADA); but see Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that discrimination in premium charged based on disability did
not violate the ADA).
128. Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
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Without discussing the point explicitly, the court thus implicitly
recognizes that the plaintiffs are complaining of the AIDS cap's disparate impact on people with the disabling condition AIDS. Other courts,
in suits challenging as discriminatory a provision uniformly included in
insurance policies have reasoned explicitly that, because all insureds are
subject to the same provision, no discrimination has occurred. 29 Such
courts fail to recognize the application of disparate impact theory to in-

surance practices; just because everyone is treated the same does not
mean that a practice is nondiscriminatory.
A reluctance to apply disparate impact theory to facially neutral distinctions in health insurance policies is understandable. All coverage
limitations will burden some policyholders and one could argue that it is
too much to ask of insurance companies to make sure that the group of
burdened policyholders is not congruent with disabled individuals. 13°
This reluctance is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's concern in Alex31 that requiring a state to avoid all Medicaid policy
ander v. Choate1
decisions that would adversely impact persons with disabilities would
impose too great a burden on the states.
This reluctance seems misplaced in the context of AIDS caps. In
refusing to apply Section 504. of the Rehabilitation Act to Tennessee's
limitation of coverage under its Medicaid program, the Court emphasized that the reduction in coverage "[did] not invoke criteria that [had]

a particular exclusionary effect" on persons with disabilities and was
"neutral on its face."' 32 In a footnote, the Court further noted that the
limitation at issue did "not apply to only particular handicapped conditions."' 33 By contrast, the Mutual of Omaha policies at issue in Doe ex129. See, e.g., McNeil v. Time Ins. Co, 205 F.3d 179, 185 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that AIDS
cap did not violate Texas disability discrimination statute because "Time offered Dr. McNeil the
same policy on the same terms that it offered everyone else. It did not treat him differently because he was handicapped, which is what we understand 'discrimination' to mean."); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that "there is no discrimination under the [ADA] where disabled individuals are given the same opportunity as everyone else, so insurance distinctions that apply equally to all employees cannot be discriminatory.");
Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding no discrimination when every
employee was offered the same plan).
130. Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the agency charged
with enforcing Title I's employment provisions, has taken the stance that disparate impact theory
is not available to plaintiffs challenging distinctions in employer-provided health insurance. See
EEOC's Interim Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the ADA, Sept. 9, 1993, at n.2,
reprintedin RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 469-78 (1995). The EEOC
makes clear, however, that this limitation does not preclude a challenge to a distinction that is
based on disability. See id. at 472. In an amendment to its Compliance Manual issued after this
Article was written, the EEOC takes the position that a health insurance policy containing an
AIDS cap would be an unequal benefit, potentially violating the ADA, if provided by an employer. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Chapter3: Employee Benefits (Oct. 3, 2000), available
at <http:llwww.eeoc.gov/docslbenefits.html>.
131. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). See discussion supra text accompanying note 11.
132. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302.
133. Id. at n.22.

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 52:1:51

plicitly limited coverage based on a subscriber's need for treatment for
the disabling condition AIDS.' 34 The coverage limitation may well have
been evenhandedly included in all policies, but it was not "neutral on its
face" and thus was evidence of intentional discrimination against persons with that disability. To point out, as Judge Posner does, that persons with AIDS have medical needs unrelated to their infection and will
receive the same coverage for those needs as persons without their disability 135 does not adequately answer the objection. Mutual of Omaha's
policy effectively means that persons who do not have AIDS will have
all their medically necessary care fully covered, up to the $1,000,000
limit, but that persons with AIDS will have care for their most necessary, life-prolonging care limited to a fraction of that amount.
Judge Posner, however, does not explicitly reject the claim of the
plaintiffs in Doe on the grounds that it alleges disparate impact. Instead,
he rejects the claim based on the conclusion that Title III of the ADA
does not reach the content of the goods and services offered by places of
public accommodation.136 For example, the court reasons by analogy, a
camera store cannot refuse to sell a camera to a disabled person, but the
ADA does not require the store to stock cameras specially designed for
persons with disabilities. 37 The ADA prohibits denials of access or refusals to deal with persons with disabilities and prohibits dealing with
such persons on terms different from non-disabled persons, but, according to the court, it does not regulate what goods and services the public
accommodation chooses to provide, so long as it provides them evenhandedly. 31 In the context of health insurance, this means that the content of a policy, e.g., its coverage limitations, is not regulated by the
ADA, even if those limitations make the policy less valuable to a person
with a disability. The court fails to see any basis for making a principled
distinction between AIDS caps and other product characteristics that a
disabled person might wish to have altered. 139 Patently underlying Judge
Posner's analysis is a fundamental skepticism that Congress would place
the federal judiciary in the role of supervising either the inventory mix
134. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (1999).
135. Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
136. Id. at 560.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 559-60. Accord McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 186-87 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Title III does not... regulate the content of goods and services that are offered.... [T]he goods
and services referred to in the statute are simply those that the business normally offers."); Lenox
v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff's challenge as
"complaining about the mix of goods and services offered by an insurance company").
139. See Doe, 179 F.3d at 560-63. Posner rejects the contention that Section 501(c) of the
ADA, with its express reference to insurance practices, should be seen as signaling a Congressional intent that Title III extends to the content of insurance policies. He reasoned that, because
the insurance safe harbor provision could well play a role in claims involving denials of access or
dealing on different terms, the provision need not be read to extend to the content of policies in
order to avoid finding it superfluous. See id. at 561-63.
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of retail stores or the actuarial fairness of the content of insurance poli-

cies.
Now, this makes a fair amount of sense. After all, I am not aware of
any serious argument that the ADA requires retail stores to stock their
shelves with products catering to the needs of people with disabilities.
But I think that Judge Posner's concern about the implications of finding
that the ADA regulates the content of insurance policies is overblown
and that the nature of the health insurance market and the nature of
health insurance as a product itself provide principled bases for distinguishing between health insurance and cameras, or between other products and services offered by public accommodations."o
First, the market in health insurance in the United States is distinguishable from the market for other goods and services. Over the past
half century in the United States, the market for health insurance has
developed, notwithstanding recent state and federal legislative efforts to
the contrary, in a manner such that health insurers' competition has focused not primarily on product quality and cost and service, but on the
identification of risk. This has led to segmentation of the market for
health insurance as insurers seek to enroll profitable, low-risk enrollees
and avoid high-risk enrollees. While the correlation is far from exact, in
many cases those high-risk enrollees whom insurers try to avoid are individuals who have a chronic medical condition or some other disabling
condition. A situation results in which the profit motive drives insurers
in many cases to actively avoid persons with disabilities as customers, a
phenomenon that does not generally occur with retail goods and services.
Instead, the profit motive spurs businesses in most retail sectors to
develop new products and technologies to compete for business from
disabled consumers. In December 1999, the Wall Street Journal described the increase in targeting persons with disabilities as a niche market for consumer products, a phenomenon the Journal calls "handicapitalism.' 4' The article describes a variety of products developed for persons with disabilities, not because a law required it, but because companies saw a market opportunity.
Health insurers, however, have not rushed to supply innovative policies providing comprehensive coverage for persons with HIV or AIDS.
140. Two district courts have questioned the usefulness of the distinction between regulating
access and regulating content. See Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1094
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that "the plain language of section 12182(b) . . .casts doubt on the
notion that, under all circumstances, the nature of the services provided need not be modified for
disabled persons"); Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215 (D.N.H.
1999) (noting that "[t]his distinction between access and content ...is not always clear").
141. See Joshua Harris Prager, People with Disabilitiesare Next ConsumerNiche, WALL ST.
J.,
Dec. 15, 1999, at BI.
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Most persons who desire such coverage would be unable to afford it if
the insurer priced it in an actuarially sound manner to cover claims. Because many people perceive AIDS (unlike heart disease or cancer) as
"someone else's problem,"1 42 the buyers of a comprehensive or specialized AIDS policy would disproportionately be persons who believe
themselves at risk of contracting AIDS. As a result, the policy price
would be adjusted to reflect the high expected level of claims, and.
through the process known as adverse selection, lower risk enrollees
would seek other, less expensive coverage as the price goes up, leaving
only the highest risks in the pool. Moreover, unlike other product developers, health insurers are not in a position to develop the improved technology, such as new drugs, vaccines, or transplants, that would lower
the cost of the product. In short, the phenomenon of handicapitalism
does not apply to health insurance.
In addition, aside from the peculiarities of the market for health
insurance, the nature of health insurance as a special good with public
importance distinguishes health insurance from cameras and most other
retail products. I would speculate that at least forty-four million Americans do not own a camera. But that is not seen as a social problem, as is
the forty-four million Americans who have no health insurance coverage. I have heard no politician spinning forth elaborate and expensive
proposals to increase camera ownership by Americans. Recent legislation seeking to increase public and private health insurance coverage
amply evidences a widespread recognition of the social importance of
health insurance that is particularly acute for people with disabilities. 143
This social importance of health insurance, coupled with the particular
characteristics of the market for health insurance, provide a principled
basis for reading Title III of the ADA to extend to terms in an insurance
policy, without compelling that the statute be read to regulate the product and service mix of other public accommodations.'44
142. John V. Jacobi, The Ends ofHealth Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 365 (1997).
143. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (increasing rights to maintain private insurance coverage); Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (creating, inter alia, State Children's Health
Insurance Program).
144. In Doe, though, the court concluded that even if it read Title III to extend to the content
of insurance policies, applying the ADA in such a fashion would violate the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, which generally reserves to the states the ability to regulate insurance. See Doe, 179 F.3d at
564. But see Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33-35 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
MeCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the application of Title III to insurance). Of course, even if
Judge Posner had concluded that Title III regulates the content of insurance policies, the court
then would have had to determine whether the AIDS cap fell within the ADA's insurance safe
harbor provision, a task that would have required the court to determine the cap's consistency
with state law and whether it could be seen as a subterfuge to evade the ADA's purposes. In Doe,
the conclusion of this inquiry would have been foregone, for Mutual of Omaha had stipulated that
it could not show that the AIDS cap was actuarially justified or consistent with state law. Doe,
179 F.3d at 558. In other such cases, such an inquiry could be a formidable task.
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Ultimately, I find the reasoning and outcome in Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co. disturbing because the court's deceptively simple
logic and analogies serve to obscure the complexity of the issues in-

volved and the oppressive impact that AIDS caps in health insurance
policies can have on people living with HIV/AIDS. The case also well
reflects a more general retrenchment by the federal courts in the late
1990s and at the turn of the century in their willingness to apply the

ADA to insurance policies. This retrenchment may be seen in cases re-

fusing to find discrimination in the absence of differential treatment, 45
cases refusing to find discrimination in the different treatment of persons with different disabilities, 146 and cases interpreting the insurance
safe harbor provision quite broadly so as essentially to give insurers free
rein to discriminate. 47 To be fair, at least on the last count, the legislative history of the ADA contains some indication that Congress did indeed include the safe harbor in order to make perfectly clear that the
ADA would not require insurance companies to change how they con-

ducted their underwriting or risk classification practices."14
Even if leaving the insurance industry alone was what Congress intended, though, that decision leaves us with an uncomfortable question:
Why, if our society is truly committed to a clear and comprehensive

mandate to end disability discrimination, is it still okay for insurance
companies to engage in disability discrimination? The answer provided
by the insurance industry (and adopted by a number of federal courts) is
that to subject health insurers to liability under the ADA for their prac145. See supra note 129. But cf.Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 31-33 (finding, in context of claim alleging refusal to issue policy, that Title III reaches an insurer's underwriting practices). Doe itself
represents a view of the ADA's applicability to AIDS caps that is more restrictive than prior
analyses. Prior to the Seventh-Circuit's 1999 decision, a federal district court had struck down a
$5,000 AIDS cap as violating Title III, see World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga.
1997), and the First Circuit had allowed a plaintiff's Title III challenge to a $25,000 AIDS cap in
a medical reimbursement plan to proceed, see Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's
Ass'n of New Eng., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994). In addition, the EEOC had successfully settled a
number of suit challenging AIDS caps. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Insurance and the ADA, 46
DEPAuL L. REv. 915, 929-31 (1997).
146. See, e.g., Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that
federal disability statutes were not designed to ensure that persons with one type of disability are
treated the same as persons with another type of disability).
147. See, e.g., Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that "subterfuge" requires an intent to evade); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95
F.3d 674, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "subterfuge" requires employer to intend to use
-plan provision to discriminate in a non-fringe-benefit-related aspect of the employment relationship).
148. See S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989), Blue 33-34 (stating in part that the Committee added
Section 501(c) to make it clear that the ADA would not disrupt the current nature of insurance
underwriting or insurance regulation), cited in LeonardF., 199 F.3d at 105 n.4. Other portions of
the legislative history, however, indicate that Congress intended that underwriting practices be
judged by their consistency with "sound actuarial principles" or basis in "actual or reasonably
anticipated experience." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 494.
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tices that discriminate based on disability would "destabilize the insurance industry."'1 49 Undoubtedly, broadly subjecting insurers to ADA liability for their practices that discriminate against individuals with disabilities would require insurers to adjust both their coverage policies and
rate-making practices in order to ensure both the legality and the actuarial soundness of their enterprise. Congress' decision not to require such
adjustments, however, likely had more to do with the industry's political
clout and less with concern about the industry's ability to adjust to new
legal requirements. "'
On a philosophical level, the question of the ADA's applicability to
health insurance is fundamentally a question regarding what kind of
social function we expect health insurance to perform. Do we see health
insurance as a way of preserving social solidarity by pooling and sharing
the risk of health expenses among all members of the community? Or do
we understand health insurance more properly as a mechanism for simply identifying each individual's expected health risks and enabling the
151
individual to prepay her expected expenditures (if she can afford it)?
A decision to limit the ADA's application to health insurance reflects a
willingness to accept the effective exclusion of some individuals with
disabilities from the social pool-as in the case of AIDS caps-as long
as insurers can accomplish this exclusion by means of coverage limitations "evenhandedly applied." The practical result, from the perspective
of the individual with a disability seems less evenhanded: the person
with AIDS ends up with tens or potentially hundreds of thousands of
dollars in uncovered health care costs, while his coworker with heart
disease or cancer has similarly extensive medical costs fully covered by
insurance.
V. CONCLUSION

Now that we have examined the ADA's impact on health care for
persons with disabilities in terms of the statute's application to individual medical treatment encounters, cost-containment mechanisms, and
health insurance coverage, we are left with the question: How much of a
difference has the ADA made with respect to health care for people with
disabilities? A frank assessment shows that, aside from its impact on the
149. See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998). Accord Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1999).
150. See Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1988: Oversight Hearing of H.R. 4498 Before the
Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. On Educ. And Labor, 100th Cong. 72 (1988)
(statement by Rep. Major Owens, in response to request that the ADA address inequities in the
health insurance available to persons with disabilities, that a decision had been made not to "take
on the insurance industry" so that the ADA would have a better chance of passage).
151. See Jacobi, supra note 142; Deborah A. Stone, The Strugglefor the Soul ofHealth Insurance, 18 J.HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 287 (1993).
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individual encounters between patient and provider, the ADA's application has to date been neither forceful nor sweeping. The ADA has indeed sent a clear message and proved enforceable as a means of attacking denials of care and failures to provide auxiliary aids, but its application to medical decision-making has been less clear. The statute has
shown some promise over the past decade as a mechanism for challenging managed care practices or other cost-containment methodologies
that have an adverse disproportionate impact on people with disabilities.
It remains to be seen, however, how litigation in this area will play out
and how willing the courts will be to scrutinize and place limits on costcontainment strategies. Indeed, if challenges to these strategies multiply,
it would not be surprising to see courts following the path trod by courts
addressing challenges to health insurance practices, where courts have
limited the ADA's applicability to blatantly discriminatory refusals to
cover and different treatment of disabled individuals in the provision of
coverage.
Our retrospective examination of the ADA's application to these
areas has uncovered complex questions about the proper meaning of
disability discrimination in the field of medical care and how far the
rights of persons with disabilities should be extended, if that extension
entails the disruption of existing structures and practices in the health
care financing and delivery system. Fundamentally, though, these hard
questions about how the ADA applies to health care end up sounding a
lot like the hard questions currently posed in the field of health policy
more generally: questions about the social function of health insurance,
how to contain medical costs without negatively affecting quality and
access, and how to 'ensure that individual medical treatment decisions
are made in patients' best interests. For the life span of the ADA, the
health care field has itself been in a state of flux, with substantial
changes occurring in delivery systems, payment mechanisms, and governmental regulations, and this state of flux appears likely to continue
for the foreseeable future. Consequently, it is not as if the challenge has
simply been to figure out how a new civil rights statute applies to a
fairly stable, well functioning system. Instead, advocates for disability
rights have struggled to figure out how to hit a moving target, as public
and private health policy-makers have tinkered with the system to try to
improve access for all members of society while still ensuring that quality care is received at a price that society can live with and without excessive governmental involvement. And as we have experimented and
we continue to experiment with different policies and practices to try to
solve the problems of our health care system, the impact of those policies and practices on people with disabilities is only one piece of the
puzzle we are trying to solve.
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One thing seems clear, though, a decade after the ADA's enactment:
health care remains a critical area of need for persons with disabilities.
Although disabled individuals as a group may be better protected from
having the door to a doctor's or dentist's office, or to the hospital shut in
their faces, people with disabilities still face substantial barriers to
health care access. Indeed, a 2000 survey found that people with disabilities were almost three times as likely as people without disabilities
to report that they had not received the medical services they needed in
the last twelve months, and the gap between people with and without
disability in terms of receipt of needed
medical services was found to be
52
increasing rather than decreasing.1
These disheartening figures, however, do not necessarily mean we
should view the ADA as a failure when it comes to impact on health
care for persons with disabilities. Indeed, I would speculate with some
confidence that the health care status of people with disabilities might
well be worse today had the ADA not been passed. Certainly, the right
of people with HIV and other disabilities not to be turned away by a
provider based on disability has been established. And the very existence of the ADA (despite the lack of clarity regarding the scope of its
application) has-particularly following the federal rejection of Oregon's rationing proposal on ADA grounds-compelled health care policy-makers and third-party payers to take the presence and needs of persons with disabilities into account in their decision-making. The work of
advocates who have exposed the disproportionate impact that costcontainment practices can have on persons with disabilities has warned
public and private policy-makers to ignore persons with disabilities at
their peril.' 53 Thus, the ADA has rendered persons with disabilities eminently visible in the boardrooms, legislative chambers, and bureaucratic
offices where decisions impacting their health care are made. Similarly,
the ADA's passage has lent support and legitimacy to the burgeoning
field of disability studies, which seeks, among other things, to raise the
consciousness of health care providers regarding the cultural and social
aspects of disability in order to enable physicians to provide
more sensi54
tive and competent care to their patients with disabilities.' 1
Moreover, it is not fair to judge the ADA as a failure in the realm of
health care, for the ADA is a civil rights statute, not a health care reform
152. 2000 N.O.D.IHarris Survey of Americans with Disabilities, Executive Summary available
at <http://www.nod.orglattitudes.html>. The poll found that nineteen percent of persons with
disabilities, as compared to six percent of persons without disabilities, reported not having received heeded care, and that the gap between reporting groups increased from five percent to
thirteen percent in the 1994 to 2000 period. Id. The survey also reported that persons with disabilities are four times as likely as persons without disabilities to have special needs that are not
covered by their health insurance. Id.
153. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
154. See Mike Mitka, Enabling Students to Deal with the Disabled,281 JAMA 595 (1999).
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statute.155 Although persons with disabilities may face barriers to accessing health care to a greater extent than the. general population, the barriers posed by lack of insurance, underinsurance, and administrative constraints on accessing care are certainly not unique to persons with disabilities. Consequently, health care reform that addresses these barriers
may play a greater role in improving the health care received by persons
with disabilities than the ADA ever can.15 Although comprehensive
reform of the health care system in the United States that would ensure
universal health coverage does not appear on the current political horizon, 157 incremental measures-such as the recent Ticket to Work and
Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 5 8-can expand the numbers
of persons with disabilities with effective coverage. Thus, those who are
dedicated to improving the level and quality of health care services received by persons with disabilities should not only continue to pursue
creative theories that use the ADA to challenge health care practices and
policies that disadvantage persons with disabilities, but should also press
for health care reform to address the growing number of uninsured persons in our society.

155 See Andrew I. Batavia, Health Care Reform and People with Disabilities, 12 HEALTH
AFFAiRs 40, 46 (1993).
156. Cf Matthew Diller, JudicialBacklash, The ADA and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 19, 52 (2000) (suggesting that a more universal approach to workers' rights could complement the ADA's protection of workers with disabilities).
157. See David Blumenthal, Health Care Reform at the Close of the 20th Century, 340 NEW
ENa. . MED. 1916 (1999).
158. Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999) (allowing disabled individuals receiving Social Security Disability Insurance or Supplemental Security Income to obtain employment without
sacrificing their Medicare or Medicaid coverage).

